Beyond
line of sight (BLOS) operations can present a number of problems to an unmanned
aerial system (UAS) operator that is not encountered when operating line of
sight (LOS). However, despite these
problems, they can also present a number advantages. From a technical aspect a number of command
and communications problems arise when a UAS system is operated BLOS due to
environmental conditions. It is up the
control system on board to take over in the event of a lost link situation,
however, when not in a lost link situation, it is up the operator to provide
full control or supervisory control.
While in control, a number of human factor issues can come in to play.
In 2013, a study was conducted by S.
Giese, using 15 years of U.S. Air Force (USAF) data consisting primarily of
“Predator” series statistics (Including MQ-1A and MQ-9). The study noted, “high
in-service mishap rates for the RQ-1 Predator, RQ-5 Hunter and RQ-2 Pioneer of
32, 55 and 334 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours respectively,” (Giese,
2013). This is high when compared the
equivalent safety level of civil aviation of 1 in 100,000 hours, (Giese,
2013). Aside, from these statistics,
mishaps were broke down by times of error, “The highest percentage of
human-related mishaps was connected to skill-based errors. As [15] had also
found, most common in the present study were procedural errors, followed by
checklist errors, inadvertent operation, overcontrol/undercontrol, and finally
breakdown in visual scan… Skills have to be learned and practiced, thus the
results suggest deficiencies in initial and recurring crew training. They could
also imply that pilots recruited to control UASs are not ideal for the task,
implicating issues with recruitment and selection processes,” (Giese, 2013).
UAS are generally operated by
aviators who at some point have flown a manned aircraft of some sort. However, not all UAS developers are not
traditional aircraft manufactures, “UASs are mainly developed by entities other
than the traditional aircraft manufacturers and are not flown conventionally
and thus do not necessarily follow the same design rules as manned aircraft.
Therefore, GCSs can be quite dissimilar to manned aircraft cockpits, and in
fact, the only comparable interface is that of Predator [15]. However, the
Predator GCS has not changed fundamentally for 20 years,” (Geise, 2013).
“The results of this study support
previous findings where the presence of perceptual and cognitive failures
combined with perceptual and skill-based errors suggested pilot Situation
Awareness (SA) had been compromised. Cognitive failures were mainly due to
inattention, channelized attention and confusion. Misperception of operational
conditions (such as altitude and speed) and expectancy were the most common
perceptual failures. Hence primarily, the crew’s ability to make observations
about the environment in time and space is affected,” (Giese, 2013).
With all of this in mind, it can be
interpolated that ground control station (GCS) layouts when flying BLOS does
not provide an aviator with data in a familiar format. Additionally, a pilot can longer rely on
tactile senses, which are sometimes referred to as the “seat of the pants”
feeling that further reduces situational awareness (SA). This is not to say that BLOS flights are
dangerous due to a loss of SA, but that due to a reduction of SA other cues
must be given to the operator in the GCS.
BLOS flights can in the private sector could provide a large market for
delivery, transportation, surveying, traffic control/reports.
References
Giese,
S., Carr, D., & Chahl, J. (2013). Implications for unmanned systems
research of military UAV mishap statistics. Paper presented at the 1191-1196.
doi:10.1109/IVS.2013.6629628. Retrieved from
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6629628